Current Affairs

It really is not a question of making a deal, it is exactly what was in the memorandum the two sides agreed – ‘an understanding.’ 

To understand the Shi’ism practiced in Iran – is to understand the Iranian state and how it is underpinned by factions, rivalries and arguments in how the Islamic regime identifies itself and how the state is perceived among Shi’ite sects both regionally and internationally. The funerals of the elite killed by US and Israeli bombing has forced the theocratic elite, parliament, and the IRGC to underpin the state’s third reiteration of the theocracy – in much the same way Ayatollah Khamenei did in 1989 – hanging dissidents, burning the stars and stripes and vowing death to the US and Israel.  

The alienation of the United States from the narrative shaping Iranian identity has evolved from the state funerals of the leadership killed in the bombing campaign. The rhetoric, red flags and promise to avenge the death of the previous leadership has made it almost impossible for the theocratic state to negotiate with the Trump administration – especially as the narrative projected by the Iranian state to the outside world has been “Death to Trump” and “Death to America” 

So what exactly did Trump think was going to happen? 

If the argument is an economic argument and a question of inflation in the US, then the argument is mostly done – as Brent Crude has slipped to $72/barrel. Yes -there have been skirmishes, attacks against ships and arguments of the route merchant ships should take – but the differences have been offset by a practical approach, which has mostly led to an easing of tension between the Gulf States, United States and Iran. However the MOU is an understanding rather than a tool that can manage a narrative and how an agreement can be stitched together once the MOU has evolved into a diplomatic initiative.

President Trump, argued that the Iranians were very difficult to do business with – and are not drawing on or negotiating an outcome other than attacking merchant shipping  in Omani waters or firing rockets into Bahrain and Kuwait – is a question of sovereign muscle rather than an argument that could be integrated into the MOU, and act to progress understanding . (It has to be understood by Trump and his administration that the MOU is the first stage of a diplomatic initiative he made happen- without an agreement or consent from the Iranian state in its initial stage). 

Commentators, argue the Iranians believe they have a diplomatic advantage over Trump’s administration, which has primaries in the Autumn. But diplomatically the language has been strained by the funerals in Tehran, NATO meeting in Ankara and Iran taking part in the world cup in the United States.   

Though the World Cup enabled the Iranians a platform to improve how they are perceived in the world, the good will the Iranians found during the tournament has been undone by the Iranian states failure to manage the funerals and a to censor, manage and develop a narrative that would be acceptable to the United States, Europe and Gulf States.  

But the demonstrations across Iran in January and February 2026, exposed the disconnect between the state, the economy, the young and the disaffected looking for change.  Though there are large crowds attending the funerals of the elite who used state mechanisms to repress, jail and kill anyone who dissented against the state, it is very much a demonstration of loyalty to the state at a time of war. 

An article in Foreign Affairs in March 2026, argued dissenting voices against the theocracy and supporters of the government were evenly balanced at twenty percent each supporting or opposing the government, However the vast majority – sixty percent are just trying to survive the war, financial crisis and environmental disasters the country has faced and brought on by the mismanagement of the economy.. 

One of the demands of the Iranians in all the negotiations that have taken place over the years, has been the release of funds frozen in European or American banks. Iran has requested the release of frozen assets held in US and European banks, but though Trump has permitted some funds to be released – the MOU as a diplomatic initiative is being expanded and has drawn negotiators into a debate that is imperative to the theocratic state.   But without the MOU evolving into a diplomatic initiative  both sides recognize the narrative will continue to be open to threats and counter threats that escalates rather than act as a catalyst to dialogue.

Though Trump is struggling to find common ground with the Iranians, the Pakistani’s believe the Iranians would like the talks to continue. Richard Burns, the former CIA Director under Biden, and a diplomat in the Obama administration- was part of the team involved in negotiating the JCPOA. Feeling aggrieved and annoyed by the length of time the talks had taken and the Iranian negotiators stubbornness to agree anything – led Richard Burns to admit the two years he negotiated the JCPOA was his most frustrating experience he had had as a government employee, diplomat and CIA Director  

But like all ex-CIA directors, Burns prognosis of the Iranian state is it has been in terminal decline for the past thirty years. But the alignment of the state to the IRGC rather than the theocracy through Motjaba Khamenei the Supreme Leader – is rather confusing.  It is very much a question of who can influence and control the narrative of the state and unfortunately Motjaba Khamenei is visually invisible, physically without a voice and unable to dictate the direction he as the Supreme Leader is taking the Iranian state. But it is the difficulty to manage a narrative and find a common language to negotiate in good faith because the factions in the state are challenging every aspect of the MOU.  Significantly, it is a failure of Motjaba Khamenei to direct the state physically, theoretically and as Supreme Leader that the MOU has become lost in the rhetoric, argument and actions of an aggrieved elite without the imagination or vision for the state and the next generation to become an integral part of the world – rather than refugees from their own family and state..

Instead, there is a call for perpetual revolution within an axis of Shiia influence. But the image the hardliners do not pull up is the image of Hamas that has created another refugee crisis for children, grandchildren and great grandchildren – all survivors of the original Nakba ((catastrophe) (great displacement)). Once housed, educated and free to travel out of Gaza to visit relatives, intellectualize arguments, train as doctors and draw on resources that had once given the refugees in Gaza an identity – are now being held together by their identity as Palestinians and not much more. 

It is almost the same argument for Hezbollah – ethnically cleansed from the south of Lebanon and anger from every sect in parliament that a direct order from the Iranian state led to the destruction of southern Beirut, southern Lebanon to the Litani river and questions whether the Lebanese state can afford Hezbollah as a proxy of Iran acting without consensus from the Lebanese army, security forces, government, parliament and the vast majority of Lebanese and a diaspora who have supported the state throughout an incredibly difficult period in Lebanon’s history. Whether Hezbollah will survive as a paramilitary dictating its vision of Lebanon to a wary government forced to step in and negotiate Hezbollah’s future in the Levant, reflects how poorly thought-out and weak Hezbollah had become before the war. 

Though the Houthi’s have not been active as proxies to the Iranian state, commentators arguments that they could or would close down the Bab el Mendab Strait would challenge the Houthi’s abillity to control Sanaa and the territory it holds without the technology imported to build the weapons, missiles and drones the Houthis depend on. Though the Houthis have targeted Israel, the retaliation by the Israeli’s has been brutal with attacks on ports, fascillities and parliament, which led to mass casaulties. But as a whole there has not been much of an escalation in the conflict between Israeli and the Houthis. The Houthis determination not to close the Bab el Mendab Strait has enabled Saudi Arabia to establish a pipeline to the Red Sea.

The country I have purposefully left out is Iraq, as far as I can tell they are just as confused as the rest of the Gulf and world at the failure of the Iranian theocracy to draw on the MOU and explore the possibilities of building a relationship with United States that would like to understand the direction the Iranian state will take in the future. I have not really discussed Iraq as it is a lesson for any state what an intransigent world can do to a people who are now just coming out of a war that has lasted for longer than thirty years. 

If the Iranians do try and move the diplomacy beyond the MOU, it will enable the state to avoid a re-imagined return of an argument that has encompassed the imagination of hawks in Washington and arguments across Europe that led to three Gulf Wars, each more destructive than the last. Since 1991, it has been a theoretical argument of whether there is an answer to “The War on Terror”, “missing Weapons of mass destruction” and “No fly zones”, all leading to other arguments, that have dismantled any belief that there is a progressive argument encompassing a way forward for an extreme members of the IRGC – who have not learnt anything from the past thirty years of war in a region that has been destaballised by conflicts, which have degenerated into death cults underwritten by a vicious confusing arguments underpinned by thirty five years of war that has scarred the Middle East.