Current Affairs

Not since Angela Merkle’s domination of Germany, has there been any leadership in Europe. The movement to the right of the electorate in Europe has had consequences for both Paris and Berlin, which are struggling with populist right wing political parties. As such the leadership of Europe has gone from dominant powers (France and Germany) to the EU commission. Ursula Von de Leyen the leader of the EU commission is now central to Europe’s movement towards a centre right coalition, which is leading the dialogue coming from the member states. But there has also been a power-shift in defence from the centre of Europe to the peripheral. The Nordic and Eastern block states are controlling how these new states manage their security and the security architecture of the EU, because of their historical dealings with the Russians.

But it is the United States that calls the shots, the transatlantic partnership has been characterised by a détente that has led to European peace for the past seventy years. The idea of the US guaranteeing peace for the period from 1945-2024 has led to a weakness in the way Europe manages its defence, and though a reliable partner to the US through NATO, it is conflicted by arguments about how a peace should be managed when there is war in Europe.

Europe has gone through a monumental change since the 1990’s and has grown massively with Eastern block nations becoming members of the EU and NATO. But it has also been realised that the countries that had once been part of the Warsaw Pact are more aggressive and demand a stronger European military pact than had been imagined by the more established nations. Nordic and Eastern Block countries realise they are in danger from revisionist ideologies that have come from the power centre of Russia. The eastern block nations are re-arming and demanding a more assertive approach by Europe’s and NATO .     

Today the conflict in Ukraine has led to arguments about budgets and responsibilities for defence in European countries. The expansionism that has taken place in Europe over the past thirty-five years has led to new defensive capabilities, where these states have increased their military spending to over 2.5%. There is a fear that the United States is moving away from its Eurocentric roots towards isolationist outlook and concentrating their military hardware in the Asia Pacific. Europeans are worried about US intentions in Europe and feel that the contract that has led to peace for the past seventy years is being challenged by US politicians who are looking to isolate the US or bring about a transactional argument.

The fear of a Trump presidency is he will rip up the contract that has kept US and European interests secure. It is the fear of Trump that most concerns the Europeans and the US electoral cycle is moving Europe into a more defensive posture than it has ever been before. The reliance of NATO on US forces, technology and wealth has been a guarantee for stability, but there has been a realisation that under a Trump presidency, treaties, NATO and defensive alinements cannot be guaranteed. If Europe is going to get it’s act together then there is a realisation that it needs leadership and because Berlin and Paris are no longer the dominant powers because of internal weakness’, they have exasperated the EU’s political arguments on defence. The EU is viewed as leading the political argument of Europe, but has not provided the member states with a new direction militarily yet.

NATO is moving from being a significant voice that has been centre stage of the conflict in Ukraine, but it is also hamstrung by the decision making of the US. Congress which withheld funds earmarked for Ukraine. This was disastrous for the Ukrainians and it cost lives right across Ukraine. Trump and Congress’ refusal to manage their own petty politics led to a lot of reflection by the Europeans on how much they can rely on a divided America. Whether a Trump presidency acts in the same way as he ordered Congress to act, challenges how the Europeans would approach a Trump presidency and his demands for a transactional relationship with Europe.

There has been a reappraisal of Europe’s relationship with the outside world, especially with the United States and China. Europe has already reacted to both the US and Chinese economies through penalties. There have been tariffs put on EV makers, there has been fines for google, Meta, X and Apple has received a notice for $13 billion in back taxes. At the front of Europe’s industrial policy is Draghi’s report, which liberalises the economy in order to make Europe more competitive. The EU has named Stephane Sejourne the minister for industrial and economic development in order to oversee the movement away from industrial blocks that are protected by the economies they are part of. The logic behind Draghi’s argument is that EU and the United States had economic parity twenty years ago. But now the US leads Europe by 20% in both standard of living and how the economy has performed. Draghi’s arguments are for a new industrial and fiscal renaissance, but there are worries that the Draghi reports arguments could lead to industrial upheaval and more Europeans facing poverty and unemployment as their economies liberalises.

A Trump presidency will allow Europe to move industrially, fiscally and technically at a faster pace as the member states become more focussed on competing with a more aggressive US. But it is very much the relationship that Europe will have with Ukraine that matters, the promise of Ukrainian membership to the block is at the forefront of Ukrainian development in the next five to ten years, which will give the EU growth in a sector that has been traditionally weak, agriculture.

Trump’s belief that he could negotiate a peace in Ukraine without the hegemony of Europe would be a trap that Putin would look to exploit in both the short and long term. Europe would look to shore up its defensive architecture and America’s military argument would be deeply compromised. Growth of the European defence sector is at the centre of the Draghi report and is aimed a building a cohesive industrial policy that drags the Europeans into a polar industrial block that feeds the best from the defence companies into a singular supplier. The defence industry would move away from its reliance on the US to provide the military equipment that Europe had once been reliant on and punch a hole in spending on US military assets.

But there are questions of Europe’s robustness and if Donald Trump exploits the differences there are in European politics, then there are fears of Europe fragmenting in both the defence of the states and monetary policy. The idea that Europe would or could fragment is not far fetched, with the rise of populist politicians, European hegemony is in danger of moving further to the right as it placates the populism of an extreme that is reacting to the refugee crisis, from not only Ukraine, but also the Middle East and Africa.

Von der Leyen’s next administration will be more pragmatic and move towards encapsulating an industrial, fiscal and technological renaissance that captures the wealth that has been ebbing from the states for the past twenty years. Whether this renaissance will include defence is dependent on the next leadership in the United States. If Harris wins, the relationship would remain the same as it is now. But if Trump wins then there will be a reappraisal in the way that Europe does business with the United States, and for the first time since the end of the second world war there will be a wariness between US and Europe