Current Affairs

Russia is moving from the argument of a Special Police operation towards a state that imposes broad security measures against its citizens. Though there is support for the war in Ukraine, opinion polls show that the majority of Russian’s not only support the war but also Putin and the government. Reactionary elements of the state argue for a harder approach to be taken both externally, internally and in Ukraine. They argue for a harder outcome, which is the defeat of Ukraine and if not – then take other measures to negate the Ukrainian state.

In Russian Forbes, Denis Volkov wrote that Russians would rather the State be bolder, more decisive, consistent and firm. This leads to the question of the reaction of the Russian public to the war and whether a hardline approach is coming into the politics of Russia. Putin has moved the state politically towards a neo-conservative approach. His vision is determined by ideas of family, traditional values, spiritual bonds and the primacy of state interests over the rights of the citizen.  

According to a Levada poll, Russians are becoming more anti-Western, more anti-Ukrainian and do not think the war will end within a year. There is an expectation for the war to continue for at least another year and  polls showed that the popularity of Shoigu is slightly down, but Prigozhin’s support among the Russian public has collapsed since the rebellion.

The idea that Putin’s inner circle keeps the President informed has been challenged by Putin appearing to be out of touch with what is really going on in Ukraine. His isolation and inability to accept bad news has been determined by a slew of the Silvoki around him. Tatiana Stanovaya, believes that those closest to Putin regulate his emotions and it ranges as he is fed news and manipulated by the type of information he receives. This failure to find those willing to give a truthful assessment or willing to give the President real appraisals may turn out to be an abject failure of his leadership.

The militarization of Russia, is seeping into daily life and empowers the ultranationalists who have an agenda to eclipse the ideologies of the state as it is. Hardliners have taken the place of liberals in the elite and the consequence is that arguments have been squashed, which would enable the public to make a true appraisal of the war. This has led to flaws in the security apparatus to underestimate political and security risk, which enabled the Prigozhin revolt and rebels to enter Russian territory, which has manifested into a danger for the states future direction.

Drones have further upset the perception that the war is in another place, the drones that have attacked Moscow are minuscule in comparison to the type of weaponry falling in Ukraine’s cities and towns, but the shock of Russia coming under attack has left an impression on ordinary Russians.  More than this, the small incursion that took the Russian rebels into Belgorod, shook the Russian military and the state apparatus that was meant to be guarding against such an event. There is a realisation that Russia is facing more incursions, but the Russian public are confused about the Kremlin’s inaction and failure to secure the state. The public are demanding that the state takes action and that there are consequences for the attacks on Moscow and Belgograd.

Medvedev, the defence secretary has become more vocal, his neo-nationalist arguments translate into threats against NATO and the West. He advocates nuclear war and intervention against what he deems as enemies of the Russian state, and wants to widen the war to European cities. His vision of a tactical  nuclear war against Ukrainians has been overshadowed by his arguments against the West. The narrative that the hardliners are trying to make is that the war in Ukraine is not about the Ukrainians but a direct intervention from NATO. He argues that Russia is not fighting Ukraine but Russia is in a battle for its survival against the West. The argument ties in directly with Putin’s own argument of Russian values and the argument that the hardliners make is that the West are going to poison the moral argument of the Russian state.     

According to Tatiana Stanovaya,  Kremlin insiders brag of the authorities ability to maintain control of the state. They site that there is consistently high approval of the public for the special military operation in Ukraine and strong approval ratings for both the president and the government. This is reflected in the opinion poll where Putin’s popularity is rated at over 80 percent. But the question is whether the polls can be trusted and the fact that any real opposition is languishing in the deep dark prison system, because of their opposition to the war in Ukraine, and also their political cohesiveness in fighting the state apparatus and control voices that challenge the essence of the states propaganda machinery.

Politically, the Putin regime is becoming less tolerant of those that challenge the regime. The security apparatus has become spurred on by a paranoia that has emanated through the media. Pundits are calling for more action against imagined subversives who they see everywhere, and voices that once challenged the narrative of the special operation have been silenced by the dominance of these voices in the media. There is a thought that the public mood that has been directed by the dominant media voices who are in no mood to hear the real news from the front-line, and are fed a diet of images that tell a completely different story than the real events happening on the front in Ukraine.

It is thought that Russians are moving towards a different reality to the once less oppressive mechanism of the news and when voices took a more liberal approach to the news and events, they have been drowned out by an intolerant and hardline media today. This has been underscored by the prison sentence given to Kara Muza and Navalny in the past couple of weeks, which ensures their voices will never be free whilst Putin is in power. The aim of the establishment is to silence voices that challenge the narrative of the Kremlin. But is this a reaction to their voices or is it a reaction to the police operation failing in Ukraine, that seems to be uppermost on the minds of the judiciary that have taken such a hard approach in the sentencing of Kara Muza and Navalny.

Since the war began, the Russian state has subverted the Liberals by cracking down on them and enacted bills, which criminalise antiwar and anti-regime activities. This has enabled far right arguments to dominate the narrative in the political space. This is a new movement and the traditional Conservatives have been superseded by the same arguments put in a more virulent way. The new stars include Sergei Kiriyenko, Putin’s domestic policy adviser, who is now in charge of the annexed Ukrainian territory. Marat Khusnullin has been tasked with overseeing the reconstruction of the occupied territory.

As the war continues the old guard have become more distanced from the realities of what is happening in Russia and Ukraine, and seem to be out of step with the new ideologies and elite sentiment about what is going on in Ukraine. There is a movement to make the military the elite power as the old guard wain in their spheres of influence, and the new neo-conservatives argue for alternative strategies to the ones that have been adopted to date. They believe that winning the war in Ukraine is imperative and that it is necessary to place all the states resources in this conflict.

Certain elements within the state apparatus think that Putin is not only out of touch but is also being out manoeuvred both by the new conservatives and those around him who have begun to direct the military argument. There is a question whether Putin is less powerful, especially as he has been seen to drop the charges against Prigozhin, who seems free to roam around Russia. The worst scenario is that Putin loses control and is seen as a centre piece for the new more dynamic neo-conservatives who are taking advantage of his inability to hear information that is bad.

Russia is transforming in ways that are going to change how the world deals with it. Whether Putin is really not being fed the latest intelligence and being force fed information that manipulates outcomes in favour of the new neo-conservatives who need the war in Ukraine to cement their power is worrying, but for the Russians the media’s inability to feed them with accurate information corrupts arguments that could change how Russia will leave the war in Ukraine and for a future peace.