Current Affairs

In the first days of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Vladimir Putin believed that the troops would be welcomed, because he believed that “Ukraine’s pro-Russian citizens had been driven underground and persecuted for their convictions.” The idea of liberator was central to the thinking of the Russian state, but the Ukrainians distinguished themselves, not just in battle but unity as a state, which challenged the ideas and beliefs of Putin and those around him.

But the fact that Russia did invade Ukraine is not an anomalies, it is more a miscalculation based on the idea of populist argument that the West would be inert and Ukraine would fold. The argument had been cast and the direction that Russia would go was central to Putin’s thesis that the the West was ethically corrupt and in that corruption there was an unwillingness to defend the West’s own values. Daniel Tresman describes an emerging pattern that Putin followed and that was “anti-Western nationalism and angry self-justifying speeches,” that empowered a militaristic approach.

According to the Historian Anna Reid, “the banging of the drum” “to gather the Russian world,” boosted Putin’s approval ratings [at home].

Though the Russian state has for the past twenty years been repressive, the repression that is now central to the states argument that it is at war, is quantifiable by the argument that the prosecution had Kara Muza sentenced to twenty five years in prison for treason. Daniel Tresman argues that “Russia is a brutally repressive police state run by a small group of hard-liners who have imposed ever-harsher policies at home and abroad.”

Factors that delineate the states desperation to close down voices was the poisoning of Kara Muza twice and Navalny, who was not expected to live. The miracle that Navalny survived was offset by the sentence that he received on returning home. This all signified that the repressive mechanisms put in place by Putin before the war in Ukraine, had worked. Between 2018 and 2021 Russia increased the funding of the FSB and the Ministry of Interior by 23 percent

Between 2017 and 2020, in a poll taken by Lavada, an independent polling company in Russia, respondents who feared a return to mass repression increased from 21 percent to 48 percent. By 2021, Russian’s polled said that they would not express opinions about the Parliamentary elections in a public place. So the censorship and repressive mechanisms that Putin placed were working. Tatiana Stanovaya argues that Putin’s two most reactionary colleagues, Nikolai Patrushev, the Secretary of the Security Council and Alexander Bortinkov, Director of the FSB, convinced Putin that the demonstrations that had taken place throughout his governance, had been organised by foreign forces.

Daniel Tresman believes that “in the environment of insularity and insecurity, war helps justify domestic repression, and the fear of Western influence at home helps justify war.” Putin’s claims that Ukraine was not a country, he argued that “for us, it is an inalienable part of our history, culture and spiritual space.”

Vladislav Sukov took a harder line, and argued that the only way to deal with Ukraine historically was through “coercion.” Sukov argued in a Financial Times interview that “Ukraine was like soft tissue between two bones, which until severed would rub painfully together.” But this metaphor itself is self explanatory to the Ukrainians who Putin argued were Nazis, though only 3 percent of Ukrainians had voted for Svoboda, a far right party in Ukraine. The question is whether Putin had surrounded himself with those unable to challenge his arguments or whether the mechanisms that he had placed in place, gave a false narrative.

In the reading of Putin’s historical perspective, Putin argues that “Ukraine’s forced change of identity is comparable to the use of weapons of mass destruction against us.” But this approach itself challenges whether there were any alternative arguments put forward. Putin argued that the Westernisation of Ukraine had been set, Russia had to push Ukraine back into the fold, but the Maidan revolution and the colours revolution, had taken Ukraine on a different path.  

But it is the interpretation of Ukrainian identity that has been corrupted, Putin argued that “Ukraine’s borders, have no meaning other than to mark a former administrative division of the Soviet Union: Modern Ukraine was entirely created by Russia.” Ukrainians would challenge this argument and point out their historical differences and question the argument that Putin had put forward.

Putin stated when talking to African leaders at a summit that Russia had reached out to the Ukrainians for peace talks, but the Ukrainians had rejected the premis of open ended talks that could or would establish the territorial gains that Russia had made. Of course this argument is not a negotiable argument that the Ukrainians can envision, but the corruption of the Russian argument is that it is as much internal as it is played to his African audience.

But the war in Ukraine is as much about the repressive mechanisms internally for Putin as it is about winning the war. The loss of the war would matter to Putin, he has already had his worst nightmare envisioned when Prigozhin rebelled. The matter that the rebellion itself was survived, does not challenge the fact that the repressive mechanisms that have been put in place did not work. The likeliest form of argument that brings change is one that is military, so to ensure that this does not happen Putin has kept Shoigu as the defence minister and Gerasimov as the leading General, both are known for their loyalty to Putin.

If the repressive mechanisms were removed, would this be the end of Putin and his small clique, this is highly unlikely as the Duma, that is meant to qualify the divisions in Russia are nothing but a mouthpiece for the Russian states continued war in Ukraine. The argument that repression can crush arguments that view the war differently have been sidelined by a media that has been harnessed. The end game is very different to what has been imagined, but it is a question of where will there be a dead end for Putin and the small group of Silvoki that have the President’s ear.