Current Affairs

It is highly unlikely that Ukraine will get NATO membership at the moment, but there is a model for Ukrainian membership and that is the German model. Germany was divided after the second World War and got NATO membership, could the same argument be made for Ukrainian membership of NATO?….

However, the German model took place after Second World War and technically Europe was not divided. The Ukrainian war is still being fought, which would force NATO to enforce article five and under its convention a country that has been attacked would expect the other NATO members to come to their defence. But the West German model was never tried out, as the Cold War was never fought, it had become an economic, political and philosophical argument rather than a war.

Ukraine is facing a very different argument, Russia has acted with aggression, annexed territory and held elections so that it can argue that through false democratic argument that the area it has occupied has agreed to annexation. Ukraine’s determination to reunify territory would prove difficult under NATO membership, because there are so many philosophical, political and military arguments that could challenge Ukraine’s independence. Ukraine’s determination to bring the annexed territory back would challenge NATO’s way of addressing a war with Russia and it could concede territorial integrity, if the political argument was complicated by political change within NATO.

NATO needs to support Ukraine especially as the war is an existential crisis for NATO members bordering Russia. It is imperative that NATO continues supplying Ukraine with more advanced weapons, especially air power. NATO must support the independence of Ukraine, politically and militarily so hopefully it can reach its military objectives. NATO could take more progressive action and bring in military advisers, but this could embroil NATO into a war sooner rather than at a later date. NATO should continue to be a partner in supplying weapons and hope that Ukraine reaches its objectives before there are arguments that push for a negotiated settlement.

Ukraine has said that it wants NATO membership, but this could prove politically difficult, especially with countries such as Hungary, which has a close relationship with Russia, but as a whole NATO members are supportive of Ukrainian membership. But it is question of stability rather than when – before Ukraine gains NATO membership.

The NATO members on the Russian borders are re-arming as fast as possible. Ukraine seems to be a lesson learnt, because of Putin’s revisionist arguments, but the question is whether Russia itself has been de-stabilized by recent events and the war in Ukraine. Is it a question of waiting for Russia to come to its senses as the appeasers at the beginning of the war in Ukraine argued, or is it all to late and the West is moving towards a cold war with Russia.

But there are other arguments, the Bucharest declaration mislead Ukraine on how much support it would receive from the West in 2008, 2014 and 2022 in dealing with Russia. The Maidan revolution itself should have led to membership, but the woeful state of the Ukrainian armed forces themselves led to questions of Ukraine’s ability to fight a war. There were lessons to be learnt and the war in Georgia, then Crimea, Donbas and elsewhere should have been watched very closely and learnt from.  Putin learnt from the war in Georgia that NATO could do very little, especially come to the aid of the Georgians. The woeful reaction to Crimea led to Putin believing that he could annex the whole of Ukraine.

Sarrotti, writing for Foreign Affairs, believes that Article 5, in the NATO convention can be sidelined, which avoids the articles intentions. He quotes Brezinski and Vershbow who argue for a “fluid security” for territory that is in the control of Ukraine and overtime “evolve.” This would mean that Ukrainian territorial integrity is underpinned by Article 5 and that it could evolve as Ukraine takes more territory, therefore enabling Ukrainian membership of NATO.

But Sarrotti argues that this option would undermine Article 5’s credibility. He argues that security would be inseparable from fixed borders and that West Germany’s border was separated at the time of NATO’s inception and there was a distinct border, which pre-dated NATO’. He argues that Article 5, would become a question of interpretation that could change constantly as the war in Ukraine evolved and that it would become a ”matter of debate rather than a deterrent.”  

The debate is not whether Ukraine will ever be part of NATO, but when. Countries  such as America and Germany argue that it would be difficult to bring Ukraine into the fold with the current war and are hesitant to become parties to the war by taking the step of welcoming Ukraine to ascension at the next NATO summit.

There are arguments that NATO must avoid mistakes that it has made in the past, and must set a time table for the ascension of Ukraine, but if it is to follow a model and that model is West Germany, then decisions have to be made at the soonest. But it is the fear of extending NATO into a position of not being involved in the war that is concerning the member states most. But it is the continued cost of the war in Ukraine, which is most perturbing and though NATO membership would mean that Ukraine was not theoretically fighting the war alone, they would continue to haemorrhage equipment and manpower.

Sarroti argues that NATO should provide Ukraine with what it needs to defeat Russia and regain territorial integrity. He argues that it is imperative that Ukraine should be treated as Germany once was, and be brought into the fold of NATO membership and will serve as a “clear and strong frontline against Moscow.”

But this is all theoretical and the summit in Vilnius is likely to make promises to Ukraine about membership, because the United States and Germany do not want to be sucked into a conflict that is proving very costly for the Ukrainians. But there are precedents that have been thought over to enable an interim membership of NATO that makes sense. Ukraine needs weapons, they need an air force that can compete with Russia, but most of all they need to be strong enough to defend their territorial integrity.

Whether the German model is the correct model for Ukraine, is still a question of debate. Scheunemann and Farkas have argued for flexibility to Article 5. They argue that the actual article does not mandate a response by member states. So the possibility of Ukraine becoming a member state of NATO does not hinge on a response by NATO members to a conflict and therefore NATO members would not be dragged into a war if they provided Ukraine with membership. But the consequences of this argument is that other members would question joining a conflict, such as in Estonia, which is very difficult to defend and has very little material value to NATO members.

This argument undermines the argument of Article 5 and the origin of its formation. It would also act as a springboard for Putin to attack states that he thinks has very little material or tactical value to the West. It is in the darkness of Ukraine that this argument will be won or lost. But it is imperative that Ukraine is given the weapons to defeat the Russians and regain territorial integrity, so they become a member of NATO and secure.