Current Affairs

Beijing has made an argument for the cessation of hostilities between Russia and Ukraine. But underlying it are a number of issues that will not end the war at the present moment. IN their plan they argue for an immediate end to the fighting and for peace talks to begin. But that would leave Ukraine in a position of lost land and all they would have to do is review what Russia did in Georgia, and realise that the country would be divided.

The Chinese twelve step plan does not meet expectations, the West cannot let go of the sanctions and Russia cannot accept territorial integrity as an element of the peace plan.  President Xi sees himself as a voice of reason, Jeremy Page, editor of Asia program for the Economist, argues that Xi views the war as an extension of the tensions between US and China over Taiwan. But Xi Jinping argues that the plan itself is an argument determined by territorial reach and that NATO forced the war on Russia.

China’s President Xi proposed a Global Security Initiative. Wong Wenbin, said that “with growing threats posed by unilateralism, hegemony and power politics, and increasing deficits in peace, security, trust and governance, mankind is facing and more intractable problems and security threats.” Wang Yi in a piece published in the Peoples Daily, argues that China will never claim hegemony, seek expansion or spheres of influence, nor engage in an arms race.”

When asked about Xi’s speech, a US State Department spokesperson said that China is maintaining the same line as Russia, “parroting some of what we have heard coming from the Kremlin” including the concept of “indivisible security.” But the argument is a lot more complex, the Diplomat argues that China is marking its argument through brinkmanship that is blatant hypocrisy and that it has already violated most of these principles through its behaviour in the South China Sea, Indo Pacific and Taiwan, not to mention the Sino-Indian border zone, high up in the Himalayas.

Though the United States has anchored its relationship in the Pacific, Indo Pacific and elsewhere that it has partnerships, China’s argument that group politics and bloc confrontations will inevitably lead to confrontation and there is little doubt that China is challenging the relationship that US has with India, Australia, Taiwan, the Philippines, Japan, South Korea and elsewhere. The US and its allies argue that it is countering North Korea, China and to a degree Pakistan, and the expansive interests of these states.

The problem is that with the GSI, the power politics of the past are coming to the fore and some of the nations in Africa, the Middle East and South America will feed into the power politics of this argument, and the fracturing of influence will continue until the world is divided between the old structures last seen in 1989.

But the GSI is possibly evidence that the confrontation between the West and China is escalating into a full fledged contest globally. What initially began as a trade war is now a tech war to dominate the industries of the future, a battle to establish dominance, not just only tech and industry, but also the concept of government and governance.

To counter this, the United States is taking more interest in the non-aligned nations in Africa and with visits by the Vice President of the United States to Africa, in firming up relationship and what the Biden administration call the Rules Based Global Order to counter Beijing’s GSI. But China’s Belt and Road initiative is of paramount importance to the development of these nations, though debt payments are coming to the fore, the development argument is a key argument. How the West moves is now determined by what these nations argue and what they believe will lead to the creation of wealth for most of these indebted states.

Last May, US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken argued that “China is the only country with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military and technological power to do it. […] Beijing’s vision would move us away from the universal values that have sustained so much of the worlds progress over the past 75 years.”

Analysts believe that China sees the world order determined by US hegemony and that there is little room for China. China sees itself as being challenged by principles of democracy and that it is a battle between the authoritarianism of regimes such as China and the rest of the world. According to Wang Huiyao, the president of the Centre for China and Globalisation, told the Atlantic that, “China, being one of the largest stakeholders of this global system, felt […] there is an urgency to propose some kind of security recommendations and initiatives” [to] “start a constructive dialogue on this issue [and] minimize the risk of the [world] falling into another catastrophe.”

But there are so many issues concerning the Chinese State itself, the Uyghurs, Tibet, Hong Kong and the threats, war simulations and the distinction between China and Taiwan. Each a cause for concern for the world and a damning argument that splits the GSI wide open, when considering how unjust these arguments are for those in prison, work camps or just trying to survive occupation.

China’s Foreign Minister criticized “fake multilaterism” and argued that it was based on “gang rules” in contrast to the Chinese states vision. The GSI is “rooted on true multilaterism,” which signifies a difference between what the West stands for and that of China. But the world that Beijing and the GSI envision is one where there is in effect a new argument determined by no rules based international order, it is an argument for authoritarian government that has not been exposed to arguments such as human rights or arguments where countries such as Ukraine have no say in the invasion that Russia has inflicted on the Ukrainians.

By reading the GSI and comparing it to the twelve point argument for peace, you realise that the war in Ukraine has become an extension to the power politics of the past. The GSI places the twelve point argument at the forefront of Western concerns and that China did not place any pressure on Putin et al, there is a significant concern that China will at some point arm Russia, if the war turns into a true loss for the Russian state and the likelihood of regime change, to a more westward looking state.