Current Affairs

“You were stabbed in the back?” “I suppose I was”, answered Jeffrey Feltman the US envoy for the Horn of Africa. A lot has been said about the coup in Sudan, but there was an inevitability that there would be a change of government. If you start from the premiss that wealth determines power, then any challenge to base wealth challenges the power of the Sudanese military itself, which of course led to the coup.

“There would have been a civil war, we had to stop it anyway that we could. There will be a civilian government and elections in 2023,” General al Burhan stated in a televised  statement.

The question is why the Generals decided to build a coup and for what reason that the generals felt that they could act with impunity against the wishes of their civilian power sharing partner. There is a question about whether outside forces were working in support of the military, or whether the Generals were outraged that they could in the future be challenged judicially. There are of course elements that support the base for the military to govern and there are arguments throughout the Sahel for the military to take command. But it is within the Middle East, especially Saudi Arabia, UAE and Egypt that support is strong for the Generals.

There is a voice that is very quiet and that is the voice of Mohamed Hamad Dagalo, the leader of the Rapid Support Force, better known as the Janjaweed, a paramilitary force, that has a few questions to answer. In the Independent Newspaper, Mohamed Hamad Dagalo tried to re-brand himself as a citizen of Sudan, no longer part of a paramilitary that raped, murdered and shot unarmed protesters in not only Khartoum, but is also accused of genocide in Darfur.

One US senator and a few analysts screamed that the Russians were involved, they argued that the elements of the coup were put together to extend the hand of Moscow in the region. “It is a power play by the Russians to get their hands on a port in the Red Sea,” an unnamed source in the State Department argued; which left open the question whether the coup in Sudan was a global argument.

Now safely at home after being arrested during the coup, Abdalla Hamdok, the Prime Minister has been silent. A technocrat, he and his ministers had taken some hard decisions to get the nation back to a more manageable rate of inflation and open the economy to more sources of income. With inflation running at 422.78% until August before taking a downward trajectory after August to 387.56%, has meant a lot of hardship for the Sudanese. The primary source to the inflation of the economy has been the devaluation of the Sudanese currency, which has pegged the Sudanese £ to the black market rate, therefore bringing much needed hard currency into the treasury. The problem has been that Sudan’s currency reserves have stood at only 9 days, and as such there has been a shortage of hard currency to import medicines and other linear products necessary for the economy. There have been shortages of the basics and also at times bread, but there was a realisation that the economy was just starting to come to the fore after the mismanagement of the economy for the past forty years.

The Hamdok administration was in line for a boost to the economy from US, EU and UK resources before the coup, US aid coming in October was meant to boost the economy by $700 million, and a further expected tranche from the IMF of $2.5 billion toward debt relief. The turn around was evident and the Sudanese £, gained internationally, which meant the economy was starting to gain traction internally and internationally.

Could the argument with the Generals be that the hard yards had been taken, and now that the economy was beginning to stabilise they were frightened by the thought that a civilian government could succeed in turning around the economy? The military were also being pushed into taking some very hard decisions, especially over the industries that they controlled, which the civilian government were negotiating to bring into the control of the business sector, rather than act as a cash cow for the Generals.

The divestment by the military in industry was meant to begin in April 2020. By May 2020, the military had declared 18% of their interests, but were intransigent about the financial value of their investments in Sudanese Industry. By August 2020, an impasse between the treasury and the military had led to a near breakdown in relations between the two sides. The demands by the civilian technocrats and international sources for transparency in the investments the military had made, placed enormous pressure on the Generals. An agreement in March 2021, seemed to mean that the military would disinvest from industry it held in its portfolio. With the realisation that the military would accept this disinvestment, and that transparency would be attained. Companies would either be released from the military portfolio into the private sector, retained by the military because of the companies importance to the military machine, or would be taken on by the government. Some of the companies would be floated on the Sudanese stock exchange, which would increase the governments hard currency reserves and balance the nation toward the political argument, rather than the military argument.

The attempted coup in September and the blocking of the road to Port Sudan, was the beginning of the end of the cooperation between the military and the technocrats that had formed the government. But it is the argument of whether the military could rule and regain any consolidating arguments that the nation could, or would accept their rule. The mass demonstrations on the 30th September 2021, would provide the necessary clarity for the military on this point, it would determine how much opposition there was to their governance and whether Khartoum’s citizens and the citizens of other towns and cities across Sudan, would accept, cooperate and be manageable for the Generals to govern.

The control the military has over the telecommunications sector, led to a cut in telecommunication band widths, which means the military have learnt the lessons of the uprising in 2019. However, demonstrations took place, three demonstrators were killed in Khartoum, but the demonstrations were also large enough for the military to realise that there is opposition, even after shortages, hyperinflation and the pegging of the Sudanese £ to rates found internationally.   

Dr Dan Watson, writing for ACLED, believes the coup has backfired and that the likelihood is that violence will increase across the country. He sees the coup as reckless, but also reflective of the economic chaos that had taken its toll on the Sudanese, he questions whether the status quo can be regained and questions whether the power-sharing agreement has any validation left among the Sudanese population:

“Do they try to repair a dangerous power-sharing agreement which has brought no concrete benefits to most Sudanese, or should they take the alternative route of building a new political order without the military and civilian elites responsible for Sudan’s protracted crisis? International powers calling for the restoration of these power-sharing agreements (e.g. The White House, 28 October 2021) are likely to be met with scorn by protesters in Sudan, though may find an audience among the less principled members of the FFC political elite.”

The reality is that the military need chaos to ensue, they are split by the supporters of Bashir, the RSF and those who want a less politically involved military. The problem is that at the front of the argument are the RSF, financially secure and bankrolled by Mohamed Hamad Daglio and his interests, which are not only in the gold mines in Darfur but also the private security company that he owns and is retained by the Saudi’s in Yemen.

Power is in the balance and the argument that the military had to step in to stop a civil war, was because of a civil war internally. The Bashir loyalists who tried to overthrow the interim government was a warning shot, it was factional and a realisation that the split in the military was serious. The reigning in of the Bashir loyalist, means the military are being cornered by the internal arguments that are testing their patience with the civilian population rebelling against their rule.

According to Reuters, diplomats, analysts and other sources of intelligence, the Generals have placed Bashir loyalists in the foreign ministry, state media and the judiciary. It could be seen as a compromise and a band aid on the splits within the military as a whole. There is not much more the military can do, they have homogenised the threat within the military, but politically they need a civilian element to govern Sudan. But who or what would agree to arguments centred diplomatically among the Bashir loyalists, or a judiciary determined by these same arguments. It is indicative that a hard approach toward those rebelling is about to take place.

Intelligence sources argue that the Saudi’s, Emirates and other sources cannot bankroll the military in Khartoum or provide enough to enable the military to gain some popularity. The gold mines in the east do not provide enough wealth, but it has been said that the wealth tied up among the Bashir loyalists will enable the military with the aid of the RSF, to tie up the population in the short term. But like everything else in Sudan, the predictability of the military machine is being undermined by the population, who move fluently to challenge the military competence, as on the 2^nd November 2021, the banks and their employees went on strike. The hardship for the Sudanese is that they realise that the military cannot govern if the nation challenges them on mass.

However, even without internet messaging boards, the civilian opposition to the military have found methods to communicate and act against the military government. It is a mass national rebellion against military rule, and if it continues the avenues of revenue that the military rely on will dry up, as they try to create an infrastructure that will buckle to their will. Mohamed Alasbat a spokesman for the Sudanese Professional Association (SPA), speaking to Reuters, said that “the protest movement has the stamina to ware down the military, with civil disobedience and more mass marches.” This in itself means that the mass protests are complete, they are representative of the population as a whole, there is no de-mark, other than a wish for civilian rule and an end to military argument through the development of a national parliament, representative of the nation, and hopefully a return to the barracks for the Generals.

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